The Italians in Tunisia

Henri DE MONTETY

article published in Politique étrangère, No. 5 - 1937 - 2nd year, pp. 409-425.

Italy had just been born, barely free from the struggles for its unification, when it was already casting covetous glances at Tunisia. As early as 1871, indeed, using as a pretext an incident between one of its nationals and the beylical government, it threatened to send a squadron to the harbor of la Goulette. It took intervention from England and France to settle this affair, minor in itself but significant.

Did not the Tunisian promontory present itself as the geographical extension of the Italian boot, as a natural outlet for the surplus population of the peninsula? Did not the lands of Africa still bear the visible mark of Rome, to which the young Italian nation claimed to trace its lineage?

Moreover, Italy in fact occupied an important position in the Regency, which it sought to develop hastily. The Italian population there was estimated at 2,000 souls in 1866 and 10,000 in 1888, compared to 700 French at that same date.

A treaty concluded on September 8, 1868, for twenty-eight years, between the royal government and the beylical government, guaranteed Italy a certain number of privileges: consular jurisdiction, national schools, national postal offices. The Italian consuls displayed great activity and obtained for their country economic concessions, of which it suffices to mention the la Goulette railway, awarded to the Compagnia Rubattino.

This name alone evokes the thousand incidents that marked the Franco-Italian rivalry in Tunisia from 1870, until the day when France, alarmed by Italian designs, fearing the establishment of a great nation on the flanks of Algeria as much as the anarchy reigning on the Algerian-Tunisian borders, finally resolved to intervene and, in 1881, militarily occupied Tunisia.

The establishment of the Protectorate, with the tacit agreement of the great European powers, caused immense disappointment in the Peninsula, and our installation in the Regency took on the appearance of a (diplomatic) conquest over Italy. Since then, a sentiment of irredentism has never ceased to stir Italian hearts regarding Tunisia, considered as a sort of colonial Alsace-Lorraine.

The conventions of 1896

When France established itself in Tunisia, the latter was bound to Italy by the treaty of 1868, a treaty for which we had stood as guarantors in the Protectorate acts and which had been concluded for twenty-eight years. It was therefore only in 1896 that Italo-Tunisian relations could be modified. However, as early as 1884, when French courts had been introduced in Tunisia, Italy had consented to renounce its consular jurisdiction in their favor.

The conventions concluded on September 28, 1896, between France and Italy were preceded by a diplomatic campaign with the great Western powers. These had indeed allowed the establishment of the Tunisian Protectorate, but it was still necessary for them to recognize it officially. It was also important that France obtain a privileged regime for its trade with the Regency and, additionally, that the capitulations be expressly abrogated. This diplomatic campaign quickly yielded favorable results: the British declaration of January 1896 relating to Siam and Tunisia; the treaty of July 1896 with Austria.

At that time, Italy found itself in a rather precarious international position. It had just suffered its first colonial disaster in Ethiopia (Battle of Adoua, March 1, 1896). Moreover, its economic situation required it to seek a trade treaty with France. This treaty was concluded in 1898; the expectation of it certainly facilitated the conversations of 1896 and allowed us to obtain a privileged commercial regime in Tunisia. But Italy did not renounce its cultural privileges, and this burden still weighs on Tunisia today.

The three Italo-Tunisian conventions of September 28, 1896, were concluded for nine years, with a tacit renewal clause upon expiration of that period. One of these conventions governed trade and navigation; the second dealt with extradition; the third addressed consular matters and regulated the condition of Italians in the Regency.

The consular convention included Italy's renunciation of the la Goulette railway concession (sold to a French company in 1898) and of its national postal offices (a reform carried out in 1897).

As noted, Italy had relinquished its consular jurisdiction through the agreement of January 21, 1884; the convention of 1896 granted some advantages to Italian subjects in this matter: a criminal jury partly composed of Italians, commutation of death sentences. Guarantees were granted to Italians practicing liberal professions: in particular, physicians and pharmacists holding degrees from Royal Faculties were permitted to practice their profession in Tunisia, and it will be seen later that this authorization brought us an invasion of Italian medical personnel.

Finally, Italy retained the privilege of maintaining national schools in the Regency, an essential privilege with far-reaching consequences, for it enabled, through its influence on youth, the maintenance of an irredentist national sentiment within the Italian colony and the development of an irreducible Italian identity on Tunisian territory. The opening of these schools had been authorized by the treaty of 1868. The convention of 1896 withdrew authorization to open new national schools in the future, but it guaranteed the continuation of existing schools, which then numbered 23 (21 royal schools and 2 private schools).

The conventions of 1896, concluded for an initial period of nine years, were therefore due to expire in 1905. They were not denounced at that time by France, because the latter was embarking on a diplomatic campaign aimed at establishing its predominance in Morocco and was using all favorable circumstances to that end. Thus, the exceptional opportunity offered by Italy's annexation of Tripolitania in 1911 was not exploited to lift the burden on Tunisia, but rather to obtain recognition of our Moroccan Protectorate (Franco-Italian convention of 1910-1912 and 1916).

The favorable moment to denounce the conventions of 1896 did not present itself until after the war, in 1919. France was then concerned about the growth of Italian identity in the Regency: the Italian population far exceeded the French population; Italian interests appeared to be growing visibly. In particular, massive land purchases were being made.

To curb Italian settlement, the beylical government had imposed a tax on real estate sales to foreigners. Moreover, it had expressed the intention of imposing on private schools a regime that would have considerably hindered Italian schools and halted their development. Furthermore, Italy needed to import phosphates, and Tunisia could supply its quota at the lowest price. Finally and above all, the time had come to settle the colonial consequences of the World War and, more particularly, to implement the effects of the Pact of London (of April 26, 1915) in which certain promises had been made to Italy on the occasion of its alliance with France.

These were the circumstances that presided over the conclusion of the Franco-Italian arrangement of September 12, 1919. Under the terms of this arrangement, the tax on real estate acquisitions by foreigners was abolished, equal treatment in school regulations was promised for Italian private schools, and phosphate deliveries were granted. Finally, the 1919 arrangement included a denunciation in principle of the consular convention of 1896; but pending the opening of negotiations to determine the future condition of Italians in the Regency, the 1896 convention was extended on a quarterly basis.

This quarterly extension, which seemed to reflect the governments' eagerness to complete their negotiations, continued until the 1935 agreements, known as the "Laval agreements," and continues still since the latter have not yet taken effect.

The growth of the Italian population

There is no doubt that Italy, embittered by the establishment of the French Protectorate in Tunisia, harbored the secret hope of one day ousting France. Although this goal was unavowed and distant, it required Italy to create a predominant position for itself in the Regency. It found in the regime of the consular convention of 1896 extremely favorable conditions for the development of Italian identity in Tunisia and pursued this policy with continuity up to the present day.

The Italian effort consisted of establishing a large colony in the Regency, securing economic and professional advantages for it, and above all maintaining an ardent national sentiment within this colony.

If one examines the demographic table above, one is struck by the rapid increase of the Italian population up to the war of 1914, then by its stagnation after that date, while the French population continued its rise until it reached and surpassed the Italian population. We shall attempt to analyze the various causes of these demographic movements, the whole of which reflects a severe struggle for numbers between the two rival peoples.

In 1881, the Italians were considerably more numerous than the French in the Regency (fewer than one Frenchman for every ten Italians). Strong French immigration in the first ten years of the Protectorate placed us in a better position, despite an equal increase in the Italian colony (one Frenchman for every two Italians in 1891).

French immigration continued after 1891 at the same pace (approximately 2,000 per year); but at that time a veritable invasion of Sicilians occurred. They disembarked at a rate of 5,000 per year, attracted by the Promised Land that Tunisia represented in their eyes, and probably encouraged by their government. Thus, the census of 1901 reveals the maximum gap between the French and Italian populations, with a difference of 47,000 souls in favor of the latter (i.e., one Frenchman for every three Italians).

After 1901, Italian immigration does not appear to have been considerable; the growth of the Italian colony from 1901 to 1911 is explained by the excess of births over deaths, which was approximately 20 per 1,000. Nevertheless, the extraordinary prolificacy of this colony allowed it to maintain a clear lead over the French colony, despite the strong immigration of French to Tunisia during this period. The census of 1911 therefore still shows a considerable gap between the two colonies (42,000 more Italians), though admittedly smaller than in the census of 1901. However, as the French population had increased substantially during these ten years, its relative position compared to the Italian population had improved (one Frenchman for every two Italians).

No census took place between 1911 and 1921, and the Great War, which falls within this period, would explain the decrease in French immigration, but not the decline of the Italian colony, which dropped during these ten years from 88,000 to 84,800—a loss of 20,000 subjects if one takes into account the natural increase of this colony through excess births. This is because during this period there was a significant emigration of Italians from Tunisia to Tripolitania and to Morocco.

The immigration and emigration movements of the European population are difficult to grasp due to their complexity, which eludes statistics. Without being able to quantify them with precision, one has the impression that the Italian colony of Tunisia was partly renewed after 1914, the early emigrants having gone to seek their fortune in new lands and having been replaced by newcomers.

From 1921 onward, the curve of the French population makes a sharp upward surge, while the Italians remain roughly stationary (and are even declining, if one takes into account their natural rate of increase). This is because at that time France was waging a vigorous offensive to achieve numerical predominance in Tunisia. Its weapons were: encouragement of immigration of new French settlers, which did not produce great results, and above all a policy of naturalization.

When France established itself in Tunisia, it organized a naturalization system based on a fiction of French territoriality, a voluntary naturalization modeled on the common law system. The presidential decree of July 29, 1887 set the conditions required of Europeans to obtain naturalization: three years of residence in the Regency and being of legal age of twenty-one. This legislation was supplemented in 1889, with minors being permitted to follow the father's status, except for their right to decline their new nationality upon reaching majority, and was refined by the decree of October 3, 1910. Finally, a French law of August 5, 1914 on the naturalization of military enlistees further facilitated access to French citizenship.

As this voluntary naturalization had not produced very significant results (2,632 Italians naturalized before 1923), the French government considered establishing in Tunisia the system of automatic acquisition of French nationality, which was in operation in metropolitan territory. This was the purpose of the law of December 20, 1923, which is the current charter of French naturalization in Tunisia.

The law comprises two sets of provisions. First, it establishes the principles of automatic naturalization: any individual born in the Regency of parents one of whom was himself born there, becomes French, except for the right to decline this status upon reaching majority; the children of anyone who declined French nationality no longer have this option themselves; that is to say, by the third generation naturalization is compulsory. On the other hand, the 1923 law sets the rules for voluntary naturalization: three years of residence, etc.

The automatic acquisition of French nationality was able to be applied to the Maltese, after an agreement with the British government: 5,000 Maltese thus entered French ranks. But the Italian government opposed its application to its nationals.

Not considering itself defeated, the French government settled for voluntary naturalization with regard to them, but organized a veritable recruitment campaign that enabled the French colony to gain 20,700 points in ten years. In this contribution, the Italians represented 12,750 individuals.

To induce the Italians to request naturalization, appeals were made to their material interest: colonization lots, jobs, salary advantages. It is instructive in this regard to observe the proportion of naturalizations by profession; here, by way of example, are the statistics of heads of families naturalized in 1925:

• railway employees: 157
• wage earners: 58
• merchants: 42
• liberal professions: 7
• agricultural property owners: 5

The farmers, constituting the largest portion of the Italian colony but having little advantage in becoming naturalized, did not take the bait.

This naturalization campaign raised the annual average of Italian naturalizations from 70 before 1923 to 1,300 in the following decade. These results did not bring about a sudden drop in the Italian population, but they slowed its growth by counterbalancing its prolificacy and a slight resumption of immigration.

Italian naturalizations have slowed in recent years, but the battle of numbers has been won: in the 1931 census, the French population equaled the Italian population; in the latest census of 1936, our colony held an advantage of 14,000 souls over the Italian one.

It should be noted that the Italian populations who entered French nationality brought their prolificacy with them, and the growth rate of the French colony has been very favorably influenced as a result. Moreover, these elements have integrated well into the general population and do not remain heterogeneous elements within it, as do the Orientals. Mixed Franco-Italian marriages, practiced in large numbers from the very beginnings of the Protectorate because French immigrants did not bring women with them, produced numerous, distinguished, and resolutely French offspring.

The development of Italian interests

The development of Italianness in Tunisia was followed and described by an eminent historian, M. Monchicourt, who, as a civil servant, hid behind the pseudonyms of Rod Balek and Cave in the copious articles he published in the Bulletin de l'Afrique Française, and who, freed from anonymity, has just published in the Questions Nord-Africaines a series of articles on the "Status of Italians in Tunisia." We believe we can do no better than to refer those who wish to possess rich and reliable documentation on these subjects to these articles, from which we have moreover drawn abundantly, our sole pretension here being to highlight the essential features of the problem of the Italians in Tunisia.

The growth of the Italian population was obviously accompanied by a development of Italian interests in the professional domain, in the real estate domain, and in the banking domain.

From a professional standpoint, the Italians have a marked numerical supremacy in industry and agriculture: 48,000 Italians against 21,000 French in industry, and 14,656 Italians against 9,000 French in agriculture. In industry, this numerical superiority is due to the fact that European workers are almost all Italian: 5,600 French against 13,700 Italians. But employers are roughly equal in number: 1,112 French against 1,145 Italians. In agriculture, the 14,656 Italians collectively own less than one-tenth of the land colonized by the 9,000 French farmers.

The Italians hold a very strong position in commerce, although inferior to that of the French: 12,000 Italians against 15,000 French.

In the liberal professions, the Italians made a commendable effort to contest an important place with us and participate in the intellectual elite of the Regency; they sometimes succeeded. The convention of 1896 having authorized holders of Italian medical diplomas to practice their art in the Regency, the health professions were invaded by them. Italian doctors, who numbered 63 in 1923, were 140 in 1933, with the French numbering only 132 at that date. Italian pharmacists rose from 29 in 1923 to 62 in 1933; in 1936, there were 64 Italian pharmacists against 39 French. But at the bar, the Italians were less successful, because in 1901 a decree made the French law degree compulsory. Thus Italian lawyers, who were the majority in 1896, numbered only 20 out of 292 in 1936, and moreover these 20 Italian lawyers were almost all Jewish.

It was more difficult for Italy to acquire real estate interests, as the capital at its disposal was limited. The land establishment of the Italian colony has the merit of owing its success only to the courage, sobriety, and hard work of its members, and perhaps its difficult beginnings gave it a greater resilience to the economic vicissitudes of the present times.

The Italians owned no land before the establishment of the French Protectorate. As soon as it was established and security assured, they sought to found agricultural colonies, which suited the genius of the race. Associations were formed between metropolitan bourgeois and emigrant peasants, the former providing meager capital, the latter relentless labor.

The Sicilian invasion of 1901 was only possible because of this system: the bourgeois purchased properties of 50 or 100 hectares and divided them into plots of 3 or 5 hectares among small peasants. It is also said that the redemption capital of the La Goulette railway, which had been purchased in 1898 from the Compagnie Rubattino for 8 million, was entirely used to buy land for Sicilian immigrants.

After the war as well, the Italians acquired numerous estates, which they subdivided to expand their land holdings. It was at this time that the Protectorate government instituted a tax on sales to foreigners, abolished shortly after by the 1919 agreements. Moreover, the efforts made by Italy to extend its land domain were hampered by the competition of French colonization, which absorbed everything available.

As a result, Italian agricultural colonization, significant in number, remained insignificant in area. In 1909, its holdings were estimated at 22,000 hectares. Currently, it does not exceed 80,000 hectares, less than one-tenth of French colonization.

But the Italian colony was more successful in the cities. The mason people were able to widely practice their art there, encouraged by the economic development of the Regency. They built for the French, for the Jews, for the Muslims, but above all for themselves. Nearly half of modern Tunis belongs to the Italians (1,700 buildings out of 3,500). Moreover, in the city of Tunis, the Italians have always held numerical superiority over the French.

Finally, the Italian colony has its banking autonomy thanks to two establishments: La Banque Italo-Française de Crédit, which is a subsidiary of the "Banca Italiana di Credito" of Rome, and the "Banca Italiana di Credito." Not only do these banks manage the interests of the Italian population, but they attract numerous clients from Jewish and Tunisian circles. These establishments operate in close coordination with the Italian government and have played a primordial role in the development of Italianness through the credit facilities granted to small national farmers and artisans.

The effort made by the Italians to conquer economic interests yielded, all things considered, rather mediocre results, and on the whole the Italian colony remained rather impoverished. Apart from about a hundred contractors, millers, large vineyard owners, and doctors, the Italian colony consisted of tiny smallholders making a living on 4 or 5 hectares, and a mass of wage earners in the service of French enterprises; it is the colony that provides the largest share of specialized European labor.

The maintenance of Italianness

Although the Italian colony is relatively poor and has lost its numerical preponderance, it has maintained a remarkable national cohesion. From the very beginnings of the Protectorate, Italian consuls did everything possible to strengthen the patriotic sentiments of their nationals, and this moral action became even more intense since the advent of fascism.

This moral action for the maintenance of Italian national sentiment is exercised above all on the youth, in the national schools maintained under the consular convention of 1896. The convention of 1896, as we have seen, set the number of Italian schools at 23, broken down as follows: 21 royal schools including 5 secondary, and 2 private schools. Of these 23 schools, 13 were located in Tunis. They received in 1896 an enrollment of 3,237 pupils.

The leaders of the Italian colony used all their skill, over forty years, to develop national education within the framework set by the treaty, and it must be acknowledged that they succeeded magnificently. The number of schools was not significantly increased (six new private schools were authorized after 1896), but each school was rebuilt, raised in height, equipped with additional classrooms—in short, proliferated in place—so that by 1920 the 29 Italian schools had 165 teachers and received 8,174 pupils, two and a half times the 1896 contingent.

It should be noted, however, that from 1896 to 1920, the Italian population had quadrupled and that, despite the effort to develop national schools, these managed to provide education to only half the school-age contingent. The other half, namely 9,163 Italian children in 1920, attended our French schools.

The fascist regime intensified propaganda to attract Italian children to the national school; all sorts of facilities were provided to families: home transportation, school scholarships, etc. The Italians thus managed to have a greater number of pupils in their schools. In 1930, there were 10,236 pupils in Italian schools, compared to 9,900 Italians in French schools.

The Italian national schools are not concerned solely with the instruction of their pupils; national education appears to be their main objective. M. Monchicourt painted, in the July 15, 1926 issue of Questions Nord-Africaines, a striking picture of the activity deployed by Italian leaders to shape the patriotic sentiments of the youth.

All the youth of the Italian schools are regimented into the preparatory formations of fascism:

• Figli della lupa: 6 to 8 years old
• Balilla: 8 to 14 years old
• Avanguardisti: 14 to 18 years old
• Giovani universitari and Giovani fascisti: 18 to 21 years old.

This is what is called: "Organizzazioni Giovani Italiani all'Estero" (O.G.I.E.). These groups, of a para-military nature, obey a hierarch, Professor Canepa, who is based at the Italian consulate.

The O.G.I.E. are primarily concerned with the physical and pre-military education of the youth. The "Giovani Fascisti" consider themselves as soldiers not yet enlisted. They have sections in all the centers of Tunisia and have equipped a stadium near Tunis that can hold 5,000 spectators (Stade Smadja). This stadium is the site of regular events under the chairmanship of the Italian consul. The O.G.I.E. are supervised by Italian teaching staff, sometimes assisted by reserve non-commissioned officers of the army. Finally, certain candidates go to attend special courses in Rome during the holidays.

This pre-fascist youth organization leads to numerous public demonstrations, of which one does not know whether they aim to intimidate us, to impress the imagination of the Arabs, or simply to maintain the patriotic enthusiasm of the colony. M. Monchicourt describes the most typical of these demonstrations and we can certify, as an eyewitness, that they took place exactly in this manner:

"In 1929, the King's birthday was celebrated with a grand children's parade at the 'Orfanotrofio Principe di Piemonte.' Four to five thousand pupils from the Italian schools of Tunis marched three abreast from the capital to Ariana (5.5 km) where they were served a cold lunch, hymns, and speeches."

"Another notable deployment of schoolchildren, four years later, at Hammam-Lif (16 km from Tunis), where the Bey was wintering. Having arrived by train, 6 to 700 fascistized children formed a column, crossed the town with a band at their head, and, puffed up with self-importance, had it play in front of the sovereign's palace. The guard came out, and, to their Roman salute, responded with a military salute."

Moreover, to instill in this youth a sense of nationalism, they are periodically brought back to the motherland. The Fascist State organized an entire system of holiday camps for Italian children abroad, and the Italians of Tunisie are particularly favored. This organization allows sending an annual contingent of 2,000 children from Tunisie to Italy. Thus, out of 10,000 students in Italian schools, one-fifth goes each year to summer camps.

It should be noted that Italian students in French schools are excluded from these camps. The military parade continues in Italy; "everything proceeds for the boys as in the barracks: division into legions, cohorts, and maniples; weapons drills, training in rifle handling for the youngest and machine gun for the oldest."

Italian children from Tunisie were reportedly given special attention in Italy; the Duce visited them. They return swollen with patriotism and bring back songs that are not exactly flattering to the French, such as this one that was sung in recent years in Italian patios: "With the beards of the French we will make brushes to polish the shoes of Benito Mussolini."

For the maintenance of Italianness in Tunisie, Italy has means other than schools at its disposal. It possesses numerous sports or charitable societies, a national hospital subsidized by the Italian State, but above all a very active cultural society, the "Dante Alighieri," and a first-rate newspaper, l'Unione.

The "Dante Alighieri" is a society for the encouragement of Italian education. Founded in 1898, this society experienced fine growth: not only are the private schools under its authority extremely prosperous, but in 1924 it purchased a magnificent building, the "Casa della Dante," which became the cultural center of the Italian colony and where frequent national events take place. It is needless to dwell on the close dependence of this private society on the Royal Consul.

As for the newspaper l'Unione, it has existed since 1885, is well informed and appreciated by the public. L'Unione evolved from a political standpoint; it became fascist; but one can say that it has always been a very patriotic organ.

The fascist regime was not received with great warmth by the Italian colony of Tunisie. This was because it was composed of a mass of Sicilian peasants infiltrated by a civic elite where Livornese Jews and Freemasons held sway. But very skillful propaganda rallied these Jews to fascism, and it was fairly easy to organize and energize the Sicilian masses.

The multiple demonstrations of fascist loyalty, in which the Italian colony frequently engages, undoubtedly bear witness to a strong attachment to the Mussolinian regime. However, pockets of anti-fascism persist in the working class, and the recent trade union movements provided them with an opportunity for renewed activity. A Sicilian autonomist party seeks to organize itself and rally the peasants.

It is worth noting the very reserved attitude of the Italian colony toward the indigenous nationalist movement, as if it were torn between two sentiments: a secret satisfaction at seeing our difficulties in governing this country; and racial brotherhood that would incline it to support the French in their resistance to Muslim pressure. As for the natives, their contempt for the "Sicilian" seems to be gradually giving way to a certain admiration for the fascist organization. But this admiration is mixed with fear, and while one does not know what hidden connections may have been forged between the fascist government and certain elements of the Destour, one can affirm that the Tunisian people remain fundamentally Italophobic. A new testimony of this was just given on the occasion of the murder of the anti-fascist Micali by Italian sailors, which raised storms of protest in the Arab press and among the population.

The Treaty of January 7, 1935

By establishing ourselves in Tunisie in 1881, by placing this territory under our paramount sovereignty, we could hope to free this country from the excessive privileges that Western nations exercised there, as in all Barbary states and in the Levantine Scales. In fact, the great nations, except Italy, abandoned their consular advantages in our favor and even recognized the territorial nature of our paramount sovereignty, by accepting that their nationals settled in the Regency would automatically acquire French nationality under certain conditions.

Italy denied us this right and, alone, retained consular advantages capable of undermining our position in the Regency, such as the right to maintain national schools. These privileges, confirmed by the conventions of September 28, 1896, placed a heavy burden on our Protectorate. This is why the French government denounced the consular convention of 1896 in 1919 and sought to obtain the liquidation of Italian privileges in Tunisie.

This was the purpose of the treaty of January 7, 1935, commonly called the "Laval accords" because it was the result of direct conversations between Mr. Laval and Mr. Mussolini.

The 1935 accords thus derive from the 1919 arrangements and are connected through them to the pact of April 26, 1915, by which Italy had allied itself with France and whose Article 13 stipulated: "In the event that France and Great Britain increase their colonial domains in Africa at the expense of Germany, these two powers recognize in principle that Italy could claim some equitable compensations, notably in the settlement in its favor of questions concerning the borders of the Italian colonies of Erythrée, Somalie, and Libye, and the neighboring colonies of France and Great Britain."

The 1919 arrangements, in addition to phosphate deliveries and the denunciation of the 1896 convention mentioned above, granted Italy certain advantages and territorial cessions along the Libye border. Nevertheless, immediately after the conclusion of these arrangements, the Italian press made it known that they did not exhaust the rights Italy held under the aforementioned Article 13, and Italy's campaign for colonial claims has continued to this day with great intensity.

The favorable moment to resume conversations and definitively settle this question only appeared in 1934, after the conclusion of the Four-Power Pact, which had allowed a rapprochement between France and Italy, and especially after the conclusion, at that time, of a trade treaty between the two countries. (It should be noted once again that the "trade treaty" is our bargaining chip in our international dealings).

The Laval accords consisted of a treaty and a protocol. The treaty settles in detail the territorial cessions and advantages conceded to Italy south of Libye and Erythrée, but simply establishes the principle of settling the situation of Italians in Tunisie, referring the details to a convention to be negotiated later, while nevertheless outlining the broad strokes of this future convention in the protocol attached to the treaty. With regard to Tunisie, there is therefore a brief treaty article and a protocol of four articles setting out an agreement on the bases of a detailed convention to follow.

The treaty was ratified by both parliaments, French and Italian. But the convention was not negotiated, because in the meantime difficulties arose over the Ethiopian conflict and paralyzed the conversations. First consequence to note: the quarterly renewal of the 1896 convention, the modus vivendi adopted in 1919, will continue until the conclusion of the definitive convention, and the Italians of Tunisie will continue until further notice to benefit from previous privileges. This consequence is moreover without disadvantage, provided it does not extend beyond 1945, since the first basic principle set forth in the protocol is precisely the extension of the status quo ante until 1945.

With regard to nationality, the protocol provides for two stages:

From 1945 to 1965: Italians born in Tunisie after 1945 will have the option of choosing French nationality upon reaching their majority.

After 1965: French nationality legislation will apply without restriction to Italians in Tunisie, meaning they will be able to automatically acquire French citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the law of December 20, 1923.

For schools, the status quo is maintained until 1955. The royal schools currently in existence will therefore continue to operate until that date; from that point on, they will be free to transform into private schools, which will not change much. Indeed, France undertook to maintain for Italians, in the future, the current regime of private schools. Under the direction of the "Dante Alighieri," the Italian schools will remain a nursery of patriots and irredentists whose sentiments can only intensify as the Italian colony's numbers and privileges diminish.

The protocol finally provides that France will have full freedom to regulate the liberal professions and consequently to reserve these positions for holders of French diplomas, with guarantees nevertheless being granted to physicians and pharmacists currently in practice.

Critics have not failed to pillory the 1935 treaty (is the critical sense not the sixth sense of the French?). It is reproached for having excessively delayed the end of Italian privileges: ten years before beginning the application of the treaty, twenty years before modifying the school regime, and finally thirty years before applying automatic naturalization to Italians, which matters most to us in order to absorb the Italian colony and merge it with our own.

This delay is obviously conducive to loopholes, and it is aggravated by the delay in drafting the definitive convention. When sanctions were being discussed in Genève, the Italian press was already beginning to call these accords into question.

It is also regretted that the negotiators omitted to address certain questions that would deserve clarification between the two countries, such as navigation, fishing, and above all the condition of Tripolitanian natives in Tunisie.

At all times, a strong current of emigration brought significant contingents of Tripolitanians to Tunisie, where they settled with no intention of returning. Before the conquest of Tripolitaine by Italy, these emigrants became, ipso facto, beylical subjects, in accordance with Islamic custom which holds that all believers residing in a country are subject to the sovereignty of the Muslim prince who rules there. Moreover, the colonies of Tripolitanians settled in the Regency became intimately merged with the Tunisian people.

But since 1912, Italy has claimed the right to retain under its sovereignty and allegiance its colonial subjects residing in foreign territory, which is moreover consistent with Western international law. A settlement was reached on this matter between France and Italy on May 29, 1914, under the terms of which Tripolitanian natives settled in the Regency before 1912 are considered definitively acquired by Tunisian nationality, while those who came to Tunisie after 1912 remain Italian subjects.

There are currently 23,000 Tripolitanians in the Regency who are Italian subjects. Their social condition does not allow them to be treated, in practice, like peninsular Italians; thus they have remained subject to Tunisian jurisdictions. Most are settled in Tunisie with no intention of returning, and since Tunisian naturalization is not organized, they can only remain within the Muslim mass as a sort of unorganized community, escaping administrative authorities, as they have no contact even with their consulate.

At one time, their repatriation to Tripolitaine was considered, the Italian government having granted the Aman to the rebels. But most of them do not appear to desire this return. They provide, moreover, an appreciated labor force in European enterprises. Their case could have been addressed in the 1935 protocol, and it would have been fortunate to adopt a settlement formula for them, for example the acquisition of Tunisian nationality after ten years of residence in the Regency, with the option of repatriation for those who wished it.

Finally, certain critics fault the 1935 treaty for not having explicitly specified Italy's recognition of French sovereignty in Tunisie. But does Italy not clearly acknowledge this sovereignty by accepting that its subjects settled in Tunisie accede to French nationality as if they were residing on the territory of metropolitan France?

Unless one should see some Machiavellianism in the postponement to 1965 of the application to Italians domiciled in Tunisie of French laws on the acquisition of nationality: for naturalization presupposes sovereignty, at least paramount, and the Italian government may have envisaged the possibility of Tunisie's evolution toward independence, which would elegantly nullify the concessions of our Latin sister in the matter of naturalization.

It is therefore very difficult, given the mists of the future, to make any predictions about the consequences of the treaty of January 7, 1935. If everything proceeds as the French negotiators anticipated, the relative growth of the French and Italian colonies in Tunisie can be estimated as follows:

Until 1965, both colonies will continue to grow at the current rate. It is to be presumed, indeed, that the currents of emigration toward Tunisie will have dried up, whether because Italians head toward Erythrée and Ethiopie, or because the French turn away from a land that appears to have reached its full capacity of settlers. Under these conditions, taking into account only the excess of births over deaths, there will be approximately 110,000 Italians in 1945, compared to 125,000 French, and if the same rate of growth persists, 150,000 Italians in 1965 compared to 180,000 French.

After 1965, a sharp drop in the Italian population in favor of the French colony through the application of automatic naturalization.

On this subject, it is rather curious to note that Article 2 of the protocol provides that individuals born in Tunisia between 1945 and 1965 could opt for French nationality upon reaching the age of majority, that is from 1966 onwards. But by that date, the automatic naturalization of any individual born in the Regency whose parents, at least one of whom was also born there, would in principle come into effect—a condition that would be met by virtually the entire Italian colony. The option to choose is such a slight advantage that one wonders whether it was worth mentioning, when so many other questions were passed over in silence.

Source :
De Montety Henri. The Italians in Tunisia.
In: Politique étrangère N°5 - 1937 - 2nd year pp. 409-425.
doi : 10.3406/polit.1937.6318
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/polit_0032-342X_1937_num_2_5_6318

1. History of modern Tunisia, Jean-François MARTIN
2. The emigration of French in Tunisia, Maurice WOLKOWITSCH
3. The Italians in Tunisia, by Henri DE MONTETY
4. Le recensement de 1906 en Algérie et en Tunisie, by Augustin BERNARD
5. Les données du problème tunisien, by Henri DE MONTETY
6. Evolution et comportement démographiques des Juifs de Tunisie sous le protectorat français (1881-1956), by Jacques TAIEB
7. Juifs du Maghreb : onomastique et langue, une composante berbère ?, by Jacques TAIEB
8. De mémoire maltaise, by Hatem BOURIAL